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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
14962

PAUL BUDDY sT·. CLAIR,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a successful appeal to this Court from a prior
conviction of first degree murder, your appellant was retried for the offense and once again found guilty of murder
in the first degree.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
There is no dispute to the fact that your appellant
killed one Vesta Wittke; Your appellant does not contend
it to be otherwise. Said the jury :
"We, the jurors impaneled in the above· cas~
find the defendant guilty of the crime of Murder in
the First Degree as charged in the Information"
(Tr. 4).
It would serve no useful purpose to again recite the
facts leading up to and culminating in the death of the
victim, of the facts this court [having reviewed the case
once before] is fully informed. Nor, do we find it necessary
to seriously take issue with counsel's Statement of Facts
as made in their Brief on this appeal. We shall make comment hereinafter on both evidence and testimony of the
witnesses in responding to the issues raised by appellant
as the case is now presented to this Honorable Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT· I.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AS GIVEN BY THE
COURT V\TAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF
THE LAW FREE OF ERROR AND NON-PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S CAUSE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE APPELLANT'S POCKET
KNIFE AND THE PORTION OF THE SCREEN
DOOR.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT PERMITTING SHERIFF GILLETTE TO EXPRESS AN
OPINION.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT .

•

ARGUMENT
POINT· I.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AS GIVEN BY THE
COURT WAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF
THE LAW FREE OF ERROR AND NON-PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S CAUSE.
Appellant complains of the instruction to the jury on
murder in the second degree, instruction No. 15, which
was given by the court as follows:
"You are further instructed that before you
can find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, you must believe from the evidence in
this case and beyond a reasonable doubt the followIng:
"First, that on or about the 6th day of July,
1953, at Tooele County, State of Utah, the defendant killed Vesta Wittke.
"Second, that the killing was with malice aforethought.
"Third, that the defendant intended to kill
Vesta Wittke but that he did not deliberate or pre-
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meditate upon the killing, or that the defendant did
not intend to kill Vesta Wittke but that he did intend to do great bodily harm to Vesta Wittke.
"Fourth, that the said killing was unlawful.
"Fifth, that the said killing was felonious.
"Sixth, that the said Vesta Wittke died within a
year and a day after the cause of death was administ~ed.
"You are further instructed that the burden is
upon the State to prove to your satisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the foregoing
elements of the crime of murder in the second degree are present in this case; and if the State shall
have failed to so satisfy your minds upon one or
more of the aforesaid numbered elements, you cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and you should consider whether he is
guilty of voluntary manslaughter" (R. 390).
It is appellant's contention that "second degree murder does
not require premeditation, deliberation, or the specific intent to kill the person killed" and, that, "It is important
to note that specific intent to kill the· person killed is not
necessary." Also, appellant complains of the use of the
words "deliberate" and "premeditate" in the above instruction. As authority for these propositions appellant relies
upon State v. Trujillo (1950), 117 Utah 237, 214 P. 2d
626; State v. Thompson, (1946), 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d
153; and, Sta.te v. Russell, (1944), 106 Utah 116, 145 P.
2d 1003.
Of course each case must be decided upon its own and
singular facts and it is now well recognized in this state
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that an instruction on second degree murder need not be
given when the facts of the case or the law itself would
preclude the jury from such a finding. This Court has said:
"That it is not error for a court to refuse to
instruct on second degree murder, where the charge·
is murder in the first degree, in cas.es where the
evidence 'vould support only a finding of first degree murder or acquittal, is the settled rule in this
jurisdiction. See State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125
P. 2d 801; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134
P. 632, L. R. A. 1916D, 590; and State v. Thorne,
41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286. The foregoing are cases
involving killings in the perpetration of a robbery.
As to included offenses generally, see State v. Angle,
61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531."

State v. Matteri, ... Utah ... , 235 P. 2d 325,
331.

However, we do not here contend that an instruction on
second degree murder was not proper in this case against
Paul Buddy St. Clair; we would contend that the instruction as given was required. In State v. Matteri, supra, this
court also said :
"While intent to kill is not a necessary requisite to second degree murder, it may be an important element if there is absent other elements to raise
the killing to first degree murder. Could the jury in
the present case reasonably determine from the
facts, that there existed an intent to kill and malice
aforethought and yet be not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the state had made out deliberation and premeditation? If they could so reasonably decide upon the circumstantial evidence presented to them in this case, then there was prejudicial error in this case as in the Trujillo case, in
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failing to include intent to kill as an ele·ment of
second degree murder."
It is readily apparent in the case at bar that there could
have been an "intent to kill with malice aforethought" and
at the same time the State might not have been able to
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was deliberation and premeditation." Had such been the case a verdict
of guilty of murder in the second degree would have been
proper; your appellant was entitled to have this question
resolved. See also State v. Braasch, ... Utah ... , 229 P.
2d 289, 294 wherein the court discusses State v. Trujillo
and State v. Matteri, supra.
In the more recent case of State v. Jensen (Oct. 1951),
... Utah ... , 236 P. 2d 445, this court stated the rule to be:
"With respect to his intent: It is the established
law of this state that in order to make the crime of
second degree murder the defendant must have intended to either (a) kill, or (h) do great bodily
harm, or (c) do an act which would naturally and
probably cause death or great bodily harm to the
deceased. State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.
2d 153; State v. TrujiUo, Utah, 214 P. 2d 626."
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant's objection to the instruction as given fails in
merit and even more particularly so when Instruction No.
1.3 is also considered.
"You are instructed that under the laws of the
State of Utah murder is divided into two degrees,
viz., murder in the first degree and murder in the
second degree.
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"So far as is applicable to this case, every killing of a human being which is wilful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated is murder in the first
degree.
"In order to make a case of murder in the first
degree, there must not only be an intention to kill,
but there must also he a deliberate and premeditated
design to kill. Such design must precede the killing
by some appreciable space of time, but the time need
not be long. It must be sufficient for some reflection and consideration upon the matter, for a choice
to kill or not to kill, and for the formation of a
definite purpose to kill; and when the time is sufficient for this, it matters not how brief it is; and
whether a deliberate and premeditated design to
kill was formed must be determined from all the
circumstances of the case.
"Murder in the second degree is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought
when death results in either of the following cases:
"1. When the killing is intentionally done, but
is not deliberate or premeditated; or
"2. When the defendant did not intend to kill
the deceased, but when he did intend to do great
bodily harm to the deceased" (R. 388, 389).
This instruction made crystal clear to the jury the elements
of difference between first and second degree murder.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE APPELLANT'S POCKET
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KNIFE AND T·HE PORTION OF THE SCREEN
DOOR.
It was the State's theory of the case that your appellant gained entry into the victim's home by cutting through
the screen of the locked back door and unlatching the screen
door (R. 127). Appellant had a pocket knife on his person
when he was taken into custody by the sheriff after the
shooting (R. 247). Appellant admitted that the pocket
knife [entered into evidence without objection, (R. 248)]
was his knife and that he had had it for several years (R.
344). The State failed to conclusively prove and the defense failed to conclusively disprove that this knife was
used to cut the screen on the door. Appellant here contends
that there was no proper "connecting up" between the knife
and the screen door so as to permit the knife to be put in
evidence. Appellant cites no authority for this contention,
but merely states that it was "prejudicial to defendant's
rights because the Court's comments on the evide:nce certainly misled the jury." (Emphasis ours.) We think appellant places the comment of the Court, to which they
take exception, out of context.
Thus speaks the record:
"MR. F ARR : Your Honor, one thing on the
knife. May we have what the F. B. I. said about the
knife read into the record, please? That is what we
were stipulating to.
"THE COURT: Well, I thought you had agreed
that he would say he had checked the knife and the
screen, and there was no metal such as in the screen
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to be found on the blades of the knife.
"MR. F ARR: Excuse me. No sir.
"MR. ANDERSON: No identifying marks that
can be traced from the knife to the screen, metal
or otherwise.

"THE COURT: Well, you would hardly expect
the harder blade of a knife to leave a part of its
metal on soft copper wire. I would think you would
look for the soft metal on the hard metal.
"MR. ANDERSON: Well"THE COURT: You can see"MR. F ARR : May it please the Court, may
we read what the F. B. I. would have said?
"THE COURT: Is that true?
"MR. F ARR: I understood that was the stipulation. This paragraph of it.

"MR ANDERSON: I have no objection to that,
Your Honor.
"T'HE COURT: Then read it.
"MR ANDERSON: This paragraph, if he wants
it.
"THE COURT: Let Mr. Farr read it into the
record then.
"MR F ARR : Reading now from a report of the
F. B. I. Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C., dated July 17, 1953, to Mr. Fay
Gillette, Sheriff of Tooele County, Tooele, Utah, and
quoting from one of the paragraphs in said letter,
the following:
" 'No foreign deposits of metal or paint were
found on the blades or in the blade recesses of the
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pocket knife, specimen Q-7, which could be identified as having come from the section of screen,
specimen K-2. None of the individual cut strands
of wire in the screen contain tool markings suitable
for identification purposes. It was not possible,
therefore, to associate by tool marking comparisons
the knife, Q-7, as the tool used to cut the submitted
screen, K-2.'
"MR. ANDERSON: That's fine.
"MR. F ARR: Thank you."
Counsel were attempting to stipulate to what the findings
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were, pertaining to
the knife blade and the screen. Thereafter the report itself
was read into evidence; the remark of the court added
nothing to nor detracted nothing from the findings of the
F. B. I. Those findings were simply that (a) no foreign
deposits of metal or paint were found on the blades of the
knife or in the blade recesses which could be· identified as
having come from the section of screen; (b) none of the
cut strands of wire in the screen contained tool marks suitable for identification purposes. It was not possible, therefore, to associate by tool marking comparisons the knife
as the tool used to cut the screen. How could these findings
prejudice the appellant's case when it was his affirmative
contention that he did not cut the screen but merely opened
the door to gain entry (R. 333). The Court's remark was
not a comment on the evidence, as might be inferred from
appellant's statement in the brief, and the remark was
made before the findings of the F. B. I. were placed in
evidence, not after.
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Appellant complains that the screen from the door was
improperly admitted into evidence on two grounds:
"First, there was no evidence or testimony that
the defendant's knife was used to cut the screen
door.
"Second, there was no testimony or evidence
that would establish that the screen door was cut
from the outside or that the defendant may have
cut it."

We would concede that there was no direct evidence adduced
by the testimony to establish the fact that the screen door
was cut by defendant's knife. No witness testified to seeing
the screen cut. There was testimony to the fact that the
screen had been cut. Patricia Wittke said she hooked the
latch on the screen just before she went to bed and that
the screen was at that time undamaged; (R. 154-5) that
she examined the screen door after the shooting and there
was a cut in the screen door (R. 155). Dayton Wittke said
there was no cut in the screen door on July 5, 1953 but
that he observed such a cut at daylight of the next day (R.
188-9). The sheriff testified that there was a cut in the
screen door; (R. 240-1-2) the sheriff investigated the doors
and observed the cut shortly after his arrival at the Wittke
home (R. 260) ; that the direction to which the wire was
turned was toward the outside (R. 262). The appellant
testified as follows:
"Q. Now, Mr. St. Clair, how did you get in
that back door on the night or early morning of
July 6, 1953?
"A. I just walked in.
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"Q.

"A.
''Q.

"A.

Did you cut the screen?
No sir.
Was the screen locked?
No sir.

Did you hear Pat testify that she locked
the screen?
"A. I did.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

When she went to bed?
I did.

"A.

Did you open the screen?
With the handle, yes.

"Q.
''A.

With the handle?
Yes.

"Q.

"Q. And you testify that it was open at the
time you came there?
"A. It was unlocked. I didn't say it was open.

Well, all right, unlocked. It opened at your
pull. Is that correct?
"A. Yes."
"Q.

The evidence was conflicting as to how the appellant secured entrance to the Wittke home, it presented to the jury
a question of fact; the weight and sufficiency thereof was
for the jury, the Court did not err in admitting the screen
in evidence. It was not such evidence as should be excluded
under the rule stated in 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law, Sec. 600,
page 922 as contended for by appellant, the opening sentence in said section, quoted by appellant, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT PERMITTING SHERIFF GILLETTE TO EXPRESS AN
OPINION.
The sheriff was. called to the Wittke home on the night
of July 3rd (R. 232) ; St. Clair had had an altercation with
the deceased in the kitchen of her home and in which
Dayton Wittke joined as a participant. St. Clair was struck
with a poker and sustained injuries on and about the head
including a laceration of the scalp. St. Clair told the sheriff
that night that "he was going to get even with that little
s-o-b Dayton and that there would be a pay day for Vesta"
(R. 234). At this trial the following occurred during cross
examination of the sheriff :
"Q. Was anything said about filing a complaint while you were at the home, the Wittke home?
"A. I don't remember whether there was anything said there. There may-there was some angry
words, and I don't recall just what they were, but
when he-on the way back I told him if he felt that
he should have a complaint that he would talk to
the county attorney.
"Q. Now, these words that you took as threats,
did you consider them as threats at that time?
"A. Well, he was angry and hurt, apparently
hurt, and intoxicated, so I just figured that maybe
they would ease up later on. Sometimes they do.
"Q.

Did you-what did you take those words

as meaning at the time when they were said? (Emphasis added.)
''A. Well-
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''THE COURT: I wonder-excuse me just a
moment, Mr. Gillette. I wonder if that would help
the jury as to what this witness took them to mean.
I don't mean to make objections for you, but I am
wondering if what he assumed it would mean would
be of any help to the jury. Wouldn't it be for the
jury to assume what was meant?
"MR. BAGLEY: I think Your Honor is right
on that. I withdraw that question. (Emphasis
added.)
These statements were made in the same
conversation where he was talking about filing a
complaint for assault and battery, were they not?
"A. I think they were made prior. I think
that is the reason I told him that he could sign a
complaint if this"Q.

"Q.

sation?
"A.

But it was all in the same general converYes, it was.

Appellant contends that the sheriff should have been permitted to tell the jury what he, the sheriff, took those words
to mean at the time they were spoken-presumably the
words-"he [St. Clair] was going to get even with that
little s-o-b Dayton and that there would be a pay day for
Vesta." Appellant says : "If the words conveyed the impression to Gillette that St. Clair was not serious about the
'threats,' then this \vould lessen the weight of other testimony given as to the premeditation and deliberation on the
part of the accused." Possibly so, if the sheriff were to
reply, "I think he was only fooling;" definitely not so if
the sheriff had been permitted to reply "I took those words
as meaning that St. Clair intended to get even with that
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little s-o-b Dayton and then have a pay day for Vesta." In
either event the witness would have been invading the
province of the jury who are charged with the responsibility
of determining the ultimate facts. The general rule is:
"It is a fundamental princi pie of the law of
evidence, as administered by our courts, that testimony of witnesses upon matters within the scope of
the common knowledge and experience of mankind,
given upon the trial of a cause, must be confined to
statements of concrete facts within the witness' own
observation, knowledge, and recollection, that is,
facts perceived by the use of his own senses, as
distinguished from his opinions, inferences, impressions, or conclusions drawn fron1 such facts. This,
of course, governs the admissions of opinion evidence in homicide cases. * * *"
26 Am. J ur. Hon1icide, Sec. 432.
The rule is stated this way in C. J. S.:
"In the law of evidence, 'opinion' is an inference or conclusion drawn by a witness. from facts,
some of which are known to him and others assumed, or drawn from facts, which, although lending
probability to the inference, do not evolve it by a
process of absolutely necessary reasoning.
"Under ordinary circumstances a witness in
testifying is to be restricted to facts within his personal knowledge, and his opinion or conclusion with
respect to matters in issue or relevant to the issue
may not be received in evidence. * * *"
32 C. J". S. Evidence, Sec. 438.
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In a civil cause the Supreme Court of Utah had this to say,
in 1921:

"* * *

some of the witnesses were permitted merely to state their conclusions or inferences.
This was also improper. It sometimes is not improper for a witness to give his conclusion from
what he heard and saw and observed where he cannot fully explain all that he heard and saw because
it involved more than merely verbal statements, provided he states all that he heard and saw and gives
the circumstances fully. Under such circumstances
the witness, although a layman, may sometimes and
under certain circumstances state his conclusion or
his impression. This is permitted, however, only
twhen there is no other method of arriving at the
true situation or condition of things."

Rockefeller v. Industrial Commission, . . . U.
. . . , 197 P. 1038. (Emphasis added.)
It would be perfectly proper for the witness to state any
facts known to him which would serve to throw light on
the meaning of the words spoken, but it must be left to the
jury to draw the inferences with the light afforded by such
facts.
Appellant says, further, that: "In any event it was
the duty of the district attorney to object and not the
courts." The rule as to the admissibility of opinion evidence
is, as stated in 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Sec. 771:
"The general rule excluding opinions of witnesses is simple in statement, but not so simple in
application, for it is not always easy to distinguish
in the testimony of a witness facts within his knowledge or observation from his opinions on facts. As
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a general rule, a witness may testify directly to a
composite fact, although in a sense his testimony
may include his conclusion from other facts. In the
multitudinous affairs of everyday life, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between 'opinion' on the
one hand and 'fact' or 'knowledge' on the other.
Moreover, objections that proposed testimony states
a conclusion only are sometimes pushed to captious
extremes. The true solution seems to be that such
questions are left for the practic·al discretion of the
trial court. * / * *" (Emphasis added.)
This Court has said:

"* * * whether there is sufficient foundation for the expression of an opinion by the lay witness or whether such opinion would be helpful to
the jury rests almost altogether in the judicial discretion of the trial judge."
In re Hanson's Estate, 87 U. 580, 52 P. 2d 1103,
1116.
The Court properly exercised its judicial discretion here and
in all probability avoided cause for reversible error had the
witness been permitted to respond to the question.

POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.
The well established rule in this jurisdiction is that in
capital cases the entire proceeding will be reviewed to determine whether there be error even though it be not assigned nor argued; State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P. 2d
1050, 79 A. L. R. 878; State v. Russell, supra; State v.
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Matteri, supra; State v. St. Clair, ·3 U. 2d 230, 282 P. 2d
323. Therefore this Court will have the onerous task of
reviewing the record of the proceeding in its entirety in
this the second trial of Paul Buddy St. Clair for the murder
of Vesta Wittke. The writer has carefully studied the record and proceedings and can only conclude therefrom that
the irregularities found to have taken place in the previous
trial of this cause were herein avoided and, in the writer's
opinion, there appears no reversible error in the present
record. We must so contend.

CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General.
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